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The Supreme Court Once Again Says No to Taxpayer
Standing-The Implications of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno
By Natasha Patel*
I. INTRODUCTION
Does Article III of the United States Constitution allow taxpayers
to use litigation as a means of obtaining a remedy for potential harm
caused to them as a result of tax breaks given to private corporations
by municipal and state governments?1 In DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno, the Supreme Court held that taxpayers do not have standing to
bring such a lawsuit.2  Toledo, Ohio had been the site of a
manufacturing plant of a certain model of a vehicle now made by the
DaimlerChrysler Corporation. 3 The City of Toledo and the State of
Ohio wanted to continue this sixty year economic relationship with
the corporation.4 In their effort to continue the relationship, the City
of Toledo and the State of Ohio gave the DaimierChrysler
Corporation local and state tax breaks as an incentive for the
corporation to expand a manufacturing plant in Toledo.5 In Cuno, a
*J.D. Candidate, May 2008, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.S.
Business Administration, 2004, University of California, Riverside.
1. Article III of the Constitution states: "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1860 (2006).
3. Id. at 1859.
4. Id.
5. Id. "Ohio levies a franchise tax 'upon corporations for the privilege of
doing business in the state, owning or using a part of all of its capital or property in
the state, or holding a certificate of compliance authorizing it to do business in the
state."' Id. (quoting Wesnovtek Corp. v. Wilkins, 825 N.E.2d 1099, 1100 (2005)).
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group of taxpayers filed suit against the tax commissioner of Ohio, as
well as the DaimlerChrysler Corporation claiming that the tax breaks
violated the Commerce Clause. 6  Before addressing this issue, the
Supreme Court focused on whether or not the taxpayers had standing
to bring the lawsuit.7 The taxpayers attempted to establish standing,
as required under Article III of the Constitution, by claiming that the
tax break resulted in a burden for them, and thus caused injury to
them.8 In line with previous decisions, the Supreme Court held that
the taxpayers must show that the injury was direct in order to have
"With consent from local school districts, the partial property tax waiver can be
increased to a complete exemption." Id. (citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§5708.62(D)(1) (2005).
6. Id. The Commerce Clause states, "the Congress shall have
Power...to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
In United States v. Lopez, the Court stated,
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce... Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, even though
the threat may come only from intrastate activities.. .Finally,
Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate
those activities having substantial relation to interstate
commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (citing Houston, E. & W.
Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States and Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S.
342 (1914), S. R.R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911), and NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
While Congress has the authority to regulate commerce, it does not always
exercise its power. Veena Iyer, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc. Dormant Commerce
Clause Limits State Location Tax Incentives, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 523, 526
(2005). When this occurs, states may be allowed to exercise power over that
particular issue regarding commerce. Id. (citing Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc.,
386 F.3d 738, 742 (2004)). However, this is not done without any restrictions from
Congress. States are able to tax citizens with the restrictions being: "1. the activity
taxed has a substantial nexus with the taxing state; 2. the tax is fairly apportioned to
activities conducted by the taxpayers in the state, 3. the tax does not discriminate
against interstate commerce; and 4. the tax is fairly related to benefits provided by
the state." Id. (citing Cuno, 386 F.3d at 742).
7. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1859.
8. Id.
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standing to bring such lawsuit; if they could not do so, they had no
standing to bring the lawsuit.9
The intent of this note is to evaluate the Cuno decision and its
influence. This note will begin with a historical background section
that will outline the Court's past decisions regarding the issue of
standing.1" The next part of the note will summarize the facts of the
Cuno case.1 ' Following this, a synopsis of the holding of Cuno and
the concurring opinion will be set forth. 12  This synopsis will be
followed by a discussion of the legal and social impact of the Court's
holding in Cuno.13 A conclusion will follow the discussion of the
legal and social impact. 14
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Article III of the Constitution states, "The judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority."' 15
The party bringing the matter before the Court has the burden of
establishing that his/her claim falls within the category of
controversies the Court has the authority to decide.' 6 The Supreme
Court has used Article III to discern which cases it has the authority
to decide and which cases it does not; often times Justices were
careful not to overstep the limitations of judicial review.'7 Article III
9. Id. at 1862. See Frothingham v. Mellon, tried with Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555 (1992). In Frothingham, the Court rejected taxpayer standing because the
injuries claimed by the party were not direct and unique. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1862
(citing Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 488). In Lujan, the Court once again rejected a
taxpayer claim because the injury claimed by the taxpayer was not "'actual or
imminent."' Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
10. See infra notes 15-77 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 78 - 95 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 96 - 213 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 214 - 279 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 280 - 284 and accompanying text.
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
16. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1860 (2006).
17. Chief Justice Marshall explained, "[d]etermining that a matter before the
federal courts is a proper case or controversy under Article III therefore assumes
Fall 2007 The Supreme Court Once Again
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restricts the judicial branch's authority to "cases" or
"controversies."' 8  This restriction requires the party bringing the
lawsuit before the court to prove an "injury in fact," so that "courts
will not 'pass upon...abstract, intellectual problems,' but adjudicate
'concrete, living contests between adversaries."'1' 9
Chief Justice Marshall was especially concerned with the
judiciary branch of the government overstepping its boundaries and
impeding on the other branches of government.2" His cautionary
attitude toward the Court exercising jurisdiction over cases which it
has no authority to hear is evidenced in the Marbury v. Madison.
2 1
particular importance in ensuring that the Federal Judiciary respects 'the proper and
properly limited role of the courts in a democratic society."' Id. (quoting Allan v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)). Chief Justice Marshall believed that the
limitation of judicial review was vital to maintaining the authority vested in all
three branches of government set forth in the United States Constitution. Id. at
1861.
18. Fed. Election Comm'r v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998).
19. Id. at 20 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939)
(Frankfuter, J., dissenting)).
20. See Allan v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984))
21. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). During his presidency, John
Adams appointed the plaintiff in this case as a justice of the peace. Id. at 155.
While Adams sealed the affidavit which contained the appointment of the plaintiff,
the document did not come into the hands of the person to whom it was addressed.
Id. Plaintiff brought suit to secure his position as a justice of the peace and
requested a writ of mandamus. Id. A writ of mandamus was defined in the opinion
as,
a command issu[ed] in the King's name from the court of King's
Bench, and directed to any person, corporation, or inferior court
of judicature within the King's dominions, requiring them to do
some particular thing therein specified, which appertains to their
office and duty, and which the court of King's Bench has
previously determined, or at least suppose[d], to be consonant to
right and justice.
Id. at 168.
The Court held the plaintiff was entitled to a legal remedy, however, section 13
of the Act of 1789, which gave the Supreme Court the power to is issue writs of
mandamus to an officer, was in contention with the Constitution and therefore
unenforceable. Id. at 162, 168, 178, 180. While Marbury differs from Cuno in that
Marbury is not a case brought by a taxpayer who argued that a legislative act is
unconstitutional, the cases are similar in that the Court explained that it wanted to
insure its actions were within the authority vested in it by the United States
Constitution. See id. at 175-77; see also Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1860.
27-2
Keeping in mind the limitations of judicial review, the Court has
often held that taxpayers who bring their lawsuit before the Court
lack standing to bring such an action.22
The Court's holding in Frothingham v. Mellon, one of the earliest
suits to discuss the issue of taxpayer standing, evidenced the Court's
reluctance to allow taxpayer controversies to be heard by a federal
judiciary. 23  In Frothingham, the plaintiff challenged the Act of
November 23, 1921, also known as the "'Maternity Act."' 24 The Act
granted funding to the states, in order for the states to use the funds to
prevent the deaths of infants and mothers.25 The spending was to
have been overseen by a federal bureau and should the bureau have
deemed that a State did not spend the money in an appropriate
manner, the State would no longer receive funding.26 The plaintiffs
22. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1862; see United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 167 (1974). In United States v. Richardson, a
taxpayer brought suit based upon an allegation of misappropriation of federal
spending. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 167. The plaintiff in Richardson alleged that
the Central Intelligence Agency misappropriated federal funds under the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. Id. at 168-69. To prove this allegation, plaintiff
requested documents that detailed the expenditures of the Central Intelligence
Agency. Id. The plaintiff also requested that the Court deem unconstitutional the
provision that requires the Central Intelligence Agency to report its spending solely
to its Director. Id. at 168-69. The plaintiff claimed his injury was in not being able
to obtain the documents of expenditures from the Central Intelligence Agency and
having to settle for documents he deemed as "fraudulent." Id. at 169. In its
reasoning, the Court quoted itself in Frothingham stating,
The party who invokes the [judicial] power must be able to show
not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some
indefinite way in common with people generally.
Id. at 172 (quoting Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 488).
The Court held that the plaintiff did not have standing. Id. at 201-02. The
Court reasoned that the plaintiff could not establish a direct injury to himself. Id.
The Court also noted that one is not equipped to judge the spending of an agency
unless it has information about the agency and its role in the government. Id. The
Court took public policy into account when it expressed that the nature of the work
of the Central Intelligence Agency is such that it is in the nation's best interest not
to give the public its information. Id.
23. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 447.
24. Id. at 479.
25. Id.
26. Id.
Fall 2007 The Supreme Court Once Again
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in this case were the State of Massachusetts and a taxpayer resident
in the state of Massachusetts; the State subsequently brought suit
against an official who oversaw the management of the Act.27 The
State argued the Act was not in line with the Constitution because it
interfered with the rights that are conferred to the States. 28  The
taxpayer argued that the Act created an injury to her because the Act,
by placing the burden of taxation on her, would in turn cause a
governmental taking of her property absent due process of law.29
The Court concluded the plaintiff taxpayer did not have standing to
bring this case because she did not establish how the Act affected her
in a direct manner.30 The Court held a taxpayer lacks standing to
contest an Act of Congress based on constitutional grounds. 31
Flast v. Cohen allowed the Court to discern between a plaintiff
who has met the threshold of standing under Article III of the United
States Constitution and one who has not.32 In Flast, the plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of Title I and II of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 because the taxes collected
from taxpayers were being used to fund religiously affiliated
schools. 33  The plaintiffs argued the spending of tax funds on
religiously affiliated schools was a violation of the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 34 The test that the Court created required a taxpayer to
establish a logical link between the status [of the
taxpayer] and the type of legislative enactment
attacked. Thus, a taxpayer will be a proper party to
allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of
congressional power under the taxing and spending
clause of [Article I Section VIII of the United States
Constitution]. It will not be sufficient to allege an
27. Id.
28. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 447.
29. Id. at 481-82.
30. Id. at 488.
31. Id.
32. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968).
33. Id. at 85-86.
34. Id. at 86.
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incidental expenditure of tax funds in the
administration of an essentially regulatory statute. 35
The Court decided that the taxpayer had standing in this case
because the spending decision of the legislature was in violation of
his constitutional rights. 36  This taxpayer was able to connect his
status as a taxpayer to the legislative act that caused him injury.37
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court further reiterated its
requirements for standing in a taxpayer lawsuit.38 In Lujan, there
was a dispute over Lujan's, the Secretary of the Interior, construal of
section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973.39 Lujan's version
of the Act applied solely to those actions "within the United States or
on the high seas."4  The plaintiff in this case was a wildlife
conservation organization which had requested an injunction
requiring Lujan to reinstate the original interpretation of the statute.41
The plaintiff argued Lujan's current interpretation was at odds with
the "geographic scope of §7(a)(2). 42 The Court cites three minimum
criteria that the wildlife organization must meet to assert it has
standing to bring a suit.43 The first requirement is: "[t]he plaintiff
must have suffered an 'injury in fact' - an invasion of legally
protected interest which is.. .concrete and particularized., 44  The
Court requires the injury to the plaintiff be "'actual or imminent, not
'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."'' 45 Secondly, "there must be a causal
connection action between the injury and the conduct complained of -
- the injury has to be 'fairly.. .trace[able] to the challenged action of
the defendant and not.. .the result [of] the independent action of some
35. Id. at 102.
36. Id. at 106.
37. Id.
38. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
39. Id. at 557-58.
40. Id. at 558.
41. Id. at 559.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 560.
44. Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) and Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-741 (1972)).
45. Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,155 (1990) quoting Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).
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third party not before the court.' 4 6 Lastly, "it must be 'likely,' as
opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by
a favorable decision.'" 47 In its decision the Supreme Court reasoned
that at the pleading stage of litigation, the allegations of injury to the
plaintiff as a result of actions by the defendant will suffice.48
However, if there is a motion to dismiss by the defendant, the
plaintiff has to give specific facts which support the plaintiffs
general claim of injury.49 If the defendant moves for a summary
judgment, the plaintiff is required once again to assert more specific
facts. 50 In the Lujan, the plaintiff asserted that its injury was that the
new interpretation would lead to the "extinction of endangered and
threatened species."'" The Court responded to this assertion of injury
by reasoning that the injury that the wildlife organization claimed
was not in fact an injury to it, but an injury to a "cognizable
interest., 5 2  The Court also reasoned that the plaintiff failed to
evidence "redressability" by criticizing the general Government
action instead of the specific decision of funding that they allege
cause them harm.53 The Court ultimately held that the plaintiff did
not establish the three requirements set forth above, and therefore,
lacked standing to bring this lawsuit.54
The Court has also been reluctant to allow taxpayers to bring suit
against other government entities such as the Internal Revenue
Service.55 Allen v. Wright was a class action lawsuit brought by the
mothers and fathers of African American public school students.5 6
The plaintiffs in the case alleged the Internal Revenue Service
wrongly released private schools that practiced ethnic prejudice from
46. Id. at 560-61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
41-42 (1976)).
47. Id. at 560 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 561.
50. Id. (citing FED. R. Cv. P. 56(e)).
51. Id. at 562.
52. Id. at 563.
53. Id. at 568.
54. Id. at 578.
55. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
56. Id. at 739.
tax liability. 57 The Court held that there was a direct injury to the
plaintiffs, but did not find that the injury could be sufficiently linked
to the government entity that is named as a defendant in the suit.5 8
Therefore, the Court held that the plaintiffs in the case did not have
standing to bring a lawsuit.59
The Supreme Court has extended the requirements needed for
taxpayer standing when challenging an act of the federal government
to acts by a state government. 60 In ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, a group
of taxpayers brought an action requesting the court to nullify a state
statute that pertained to mineral leases on state lands.61  The
taxpayers alleged that the statute did not observe the requirements
that the legislative branch set forth to the States prior to the States
renting or selling the land.62  The government argued that the
taxpayers did not have standing to bring this case in a federal court.6 3
While the plaintiffs stated their injury as being: "deprive[ed] the
school trust funds of millions of dollars thereby resulting in
unnecessarily higher taxes," the Court did not find that the plaintiffs
established a causal link between their injuries and the action of the
government; furthermore, the Court did not find that granting the
relief that the plaintiffs requested would have the outcome of lifting
the tax burden from the plaintiff.64 Therefore, the Court held that the
taxpayers in this situation lacked standing. 65
57. Id. The Internal Revenue Service will withdraw a school's tax exempt
status if it does not demonstrate that it
admits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges,
programs, and activities generally accorded or made available to
students at that school and that the school does not discriminate
on the basis of race in administration of its educational policies,
admissions policies, scholarship and loan programs, and athletic
and other school-administered programs.
Id. at 740 (quoting REv. PROC. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587).
58. Id. at 756-57.
59. Id. at 765-66.
60. ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
61. Id. at 610.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 613.
64. Id. at 614.
65. Id. at 616-17.
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While the Court has been reluctant to hold that the taxpayers have
standing to assert a lawsuit against a government entity, there have
been some occasions in which the Court has held that the taxpayer
had standing. 66 Richards v. Jefferson County, demonstrates a lawsuit
in which taxpayers were deemed to have standing because the injury
caused to them was direct.67 The plaintiffs in this case worked in the
private sector of Richards County. 68 They objected to an occupation
tax levied upon them by Jefferson County. 69  In its reasoning the
Court categorized taxpayer lawsuits into two groups. 70 The first
group consisted of lawsuits by taxpayers who were using their
position as taxpayers to permit them to bring a lawsuit for the
purpose of stating their grievances concerning the misappropriation
of public, fiscal resources; these taxpayers also only suffer a
circuitous injury.71  The second group consisted of taxpayers the
Court felt "deserved their [own] day in court. 72 The Court held that
the taxpayers in this lawsuit fell into the second category; the Court
further concluded that the plaintiffs in this lawsuit were not
adequately represented in the previous litigation and therefore are not
precluded from bringing their own suit.73
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno is the latest of an array of cases
in which taxpayers file suit because they allege to be injured by
governmental actions.74 The action stems from a tax exemption
given to a corporation by the State of Ohio after meeting the
requirements of a provision of Ohio's revenue code, which states,
"[w]ith consent from local school districts, the partial property tax
waiver can be increased to a complete exemption., 75  The Cuno
decision further reiterates the Courts caution of overstepping its
66. Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996).
67. Richards, 517 U.S. 793.
68. Id. at 794.
69. Id. at 794-95.
70. Id. at 803.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 803, 805.
74. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1854 (2006).
75. Id. at 1859.
authority in presiding over taxpayer lawsuits unless a direct injury
can be established by the plaintiff.76
III. FACTS
The state of Ohio and the city of Toledo located in the state of
Ohio desired to have DaimlerChrysler expand its manufacturing
operations in Toledo, Ohio.77 The manufacturing operation in
Toledo, Ohio dated back to 194 1.78 Jeeps, the type of vehicle that the
state of Ohio wished for the DaimlerChrysler Corporation to continue
to manufacture in Toledo, were first created for the United States
Military by a motor company whose operations were in Toledo,
Ohio.79 More than half a century later, Ohio and the City of Toledo
wished to support further production and expansion of production of
the Jeep in Toledo, Ohio. 80 In order to facilitate this expansion, the
city of Toledo in conjunction with the state of Ohio contracted a deal
with the DaimlerChrysler Corporation in which the corporation
would receive tax benefits in exchange for an expansion of
operations in Toledo. 8' In 1998, the benefit was approved by the
local school districts, as required by Ohio law. 82 DaimlerChrysler
began buying appliances for its expansion after its property tax was
suspended as a result of a waiver given to the corporation by the state
of Ohio. 83
The plaintiffs, who were mainly taxpayers from Toledo, but also
included taxpayers from other cities in Ohio and the State of
Michigan, claim that the deal between the State of Ohio, the City of
Toledo, and DaimlerChrysler violated the Commerce Clause.84
Furthermore, the plaintiffs asserted that the tax break given to
DaimlerChrysler did indeed result in a "'disproportionate burden"'
76. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854.
77. Id. at 1859.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1859.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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on them.8 5 The plaintiffs wanted to remand their claim to state court
when it was filed in District Court because the plaintiffs had
"'substantial doubts about their ability to satisfy either the
constitutional or the prudential limitations on standing in federal
court.' ' 8 6 The District Court did not remand, reasoning "'at the bare
minimum the Plaintiffs who are taxpayers have standing to object to
property tax exemption and franchise tax credit statutes under the
'municipal taxpayer standing' rule articulated in Massachusetts v.
Mellon.' 87 The District Court decided the case on the merits and
decided that the contract between the DaimlerChrysler Corporation,
the State of Ohio, and the City of Toledo located in Ohio did not
violate the Commerce Clause.8  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that the local tax did not violate the Commerce Clause
but the state tax break was a violation of the Commerce Clause.8
9
The plaintiffs filed a writ of certiorari in order to have the validity of
the property tax exemption reviewed. 90 The defendants also filed a
writ of certiorari in order to have the rejection of the franchise tax
credit reviewed. 9' Before making a decision on whether the tax
breaks violated the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court addressed
85. Id. (quoting App. 18a, 23a, 28a. n2).
86. Id. at 1860 (quoting Pis.' Supplemental Mot. for Remand to State Court
(No. 3:00cv7247), p. 13, R. Doc. 17).
87. Id. at 1860 (quoting Frothingham, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)). As discussed
earlier, Frothingham involved a case in which the plaintiffs were taxpayers who
brought a lawsuit because the State of Massachusetts was using state funds to
prevent the deaths of infants and mothers, as was required by the Maternity Act
adopted by Congress. Id. at 479. The State of Massachusetts also brought a
lawsuit against the same individual that the taxpayers brought suit against. Id..
The taxpayer argued that the Act creates an injury to her because the Act, by
placing the burden of taxation on her, will in tern cause a governmental taking of
her property absent due process of law. Id. at 481-82. The Court concluded
plaintiff taxpayer did not have standing to bring this case because she cannot
establish how this Act affected her in a direct manner. Id. at 488. The Court held a
taxpayer lacks standing to contest an act of Congress based on constitutional
grounds. Id.
88. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1860.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
the issue of whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring such a
lawsuit.9"
The Supreme Court held that the taxpayers did not have standing
to bring an objection to the tax credits that the City of Toledo or the
State of Ohio gave to the DaimlerChrysler Corporation. 93 Therefore,
the judgments of the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit were considered to be in error and ordered to be
"vacated in part, and... remanded for dismissal of plaintiffs'
challenge to the franchise tax credit."
94
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Chief Justice Roberts'Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts began his opinion by reciting the facts of
this case. 95 The beginning of the opinion also cited the Ohio law that
allowed for such tax breaks to a corporation.96  The opinion
proceeded to trace the history of Cuno from the District Court to its
current status at the United States Supreme Court.97 The opinion first
92. Id. More specifically, the Supreme Court first wanted to address whether
the plaintiffs had standing on the issue of objecting to the franchise tax credit. Id.
93. Id. at 1868.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1859.
96. Id. Ohio law requires the collection of franchise tax "'upon corporations
for the privilege of doing business in the state, owning or using a part or all of its
capital or property in [the] state, or holding a certificate of compliance authorizing
it to do business in [the] state."' Id. (quoting Wesnovtek Corp. v. Wilkins, 825
N.E.2d 1099, 1100, citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §5733.01 (Lexis 2005)).
Furthermore, a taxpayer who buys "'new manufacturing machinery and equipment'
and installs it at sites in the State receives a credit against the franchise tax." Id.
(quoting Wilkins, 825 N.E.2d at 1100, citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§5709.62(C)(1)(a) (Lexis 2005)).
97. Id. at 1860. The plaintiffs wanted to remand their claim to state court
when it was filed in District Court because the plaintiffs had "'substantial doubts
about their ability to satisfy either the constitutional or the prudential limitations on
standing in federal court."' Id. (quoting Pis.' Supplemental Mot. for Remand to
State Court (No. 3:00cv7247), p.13, Record Doc. 17.) The District Court did not
remand, reasoning, "'at a bare minimum the Plaintiffs who are taxpayers have
standing to object to property tax exemption and franchise tax credit statutes under
the 'municipal taxpayer standing' rule articulated in Massachusetts v. Mellon."' Id.
Fall.2007 The Supreme Court Once Again
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addressed the issue of whether or not the plaintiffs have standing
under Article III of the United States Constitution to bring a lawsuit
that contests a franchise tax credit given to DaimlerChrysler
Corporation by the State of Ohio and the city of Toledo. 98
Chief Justice Roberts proceeded to give a historical analysis on
how the Court has dealt with issues of standing in the past.99 He first
referenced Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v.
Madison.'00 In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall expressed his belief
in the importance of each role of the government exercising the
powers given to it by the United States Constitution. 0 1 Chief Justice
Roberts stated, "[d]etermining that a matter before the federal courts
is a proper case or controversy under Article III therefore assumes
particular importance in ensuring that the Federal Judiciary respects
"'the proper - properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic
society."' 10 2 He further reiterated this point by quoting Raines v.
Byrd, "'no principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper
role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of
federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.' 10 3 Chief
Justice Roberts then analyzed the requirement of case-or-controversy
that is needed to fulfill the requirement of standing under Article III
The District Court decided the case on the merits and decided that the contract
between the DaimlerChrysler Corporation, the state of Ohio, and the city of Toledo
located in Ohio did not violate the Commerce Clause. Id. The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that the local tax did not violate the Commerce Clause but
the state tax break was a violation of the Commerce Clause. Id. The plaintiffs filed
a writ of certiorari in order to have the validity of the property tax exemption
reviewed. Id. The defendants also filed a writ of certiorari to have the rejection of
the franchise tax credit reviewed. Id. Before making a decision on whether the tax
breaks violated the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring such lawsuit. Id.
98. Id. Chief Justice Roberts quoted Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. "'We have 'an obligation to assure ourselves"
of litigants' standing under Article III."' Id. (quoting Friends of Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000)).
99. Id.
100. Cuno, 126 S. Ct at 1860.
101. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).
102. Id. (citing Wright, 468 U.S. at 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498 (1975))).
103. Id. at 1861 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)).
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of the United States Constitution.1"4 He began by giving an essential
component for standing: "'a plaintiff must allege personal injury
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and
likely to be redressed by the requested relief.'""05 He pointed out that
the burden of proving that the case is within the limits of the types of
cases that the Supreme Court has the authority to preside over falls
on the plaintiff.0 6  Chief Justice Roberts then addressed the
plaintiffs' first argument as to the establishment of standing.'0 7 The
plaintiffs asserted that they have standing because of the fact that
they are taxpayers and as taxpayers they have been injured as a result
of the contract between DaimlerChrysler and the State of Ohio.'
0 8
"'[The agreement] depletes the funds of the State of Ohio to which
the plaintiffs contribute through their tax payments and thus
'diminishes the total funds available for lawful uses and imposes
disproportionate burdens on' them."' 0 9  Chief Justice Roberts
addressed the fact that the Court has made many decisions regarding
the standing of a federal taxpayer." 0 He explained that the Court has
mostly denied standing to those who bring a lawsuit and assert
standing based on the fact that he/she is a federal taxpayer."' Chief
Justice Roberts explained that the common thread amongst the
previous cases in which the Court has rejected standing can be found
in Frothingham, one of the first cases in which the Supreme Court
even addressed the issue."1 2
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1862.
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting App. 28a citing Resp't.'s Br. 24).
110. Id.
111. Id. Chief Justice Roberts alluded to the Court's decision in Ala. Power
Co. v. Ickes, in which the Court reasoned "'the interest of a taxpayer in the moneys
of the federal treasury furnishes no basis' to argue that a federal agency's loan
practices are unconstitutional." Id. (quoting Ala. Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464,
478 (1938)). See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974); see also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
112. Id.
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[I]nterest in the moneys of the Treasury... is shared
with millions of others; is comparatively minute and
indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation of
any payment of the funds so remote, fluctuating and
uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the
preventative powers of a court of equity.' 13
Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the logic applied in
Frothingham is applicable to Cuno."14 He then cited the reasoning
used by the Court in the past to reject the notion of taxpayer
standing." 5 He began by citing Lujan, which states "[s]tanding has
been rejected in such cases because the alleged injury is not 'concrete
and particularized."" 16 He further reasoned that the injury that the
taxpayers are claiming are not unique to them but an example in
which they have "' suffer[ed] in some indefinite way in common with
people generally.""'1 7 Chief Justice Roberts opined that this case
falls into the same category as Lujan in that "the 'injury [the
plaintiffs claim to suffer from] is not 'actual or imminent,' but
instead 'conjectural or hypothetical.'1 18
Chief Justice Roberts asserted that the plaintiffs have not
provided evidence that tax breaks given to the DaimlerChrysler
Corporation by the State of Ohio have actually caused a depletion of
money in the state funds." 9 Furthermore, he alluded to the fact that
the motive of the State of Ohio to give such a tax break to the
DaimlerChrysler Corporation was to encourage a growth in the
state's economy, which served to improve state funds. 2 ° Chief
Justice Roberts furthered his reasoning that the injury claimed by the
plaintiffs in this case is only theoretical and not realized by arguing
113. Id.(quoting Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486-487).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
117. Id. (quoting Frothingham 262 U.S. at 488).
118. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
119. Id.
120. Id. Some of the plaintiffs were residents of Michigan. Id. These
plaintiffs were making the same argument as the Ohio residents in that an
expansion planned for Michigan would cause them injury by depleting Michigan
state funds. Id.
that the injury caused to the plaintiff is conditioned on how
congressional representatives react to a depletion in funds that was
caused by the tax break. 12 1 Chief Justice Roberts found that the
plaintiffs' claim of injury required one to suppose that legislatures
will raise taxes in an effort to combat the deficit resulting from the
tax break given to DaimlerChrysler Corporation. 122 Following this
line of reasoning, Chief Justice Roberts stated that there is a
requirement of further supposition in the plaintiffs' claim of injury in
that it requires one to suppose that voiding the tax break given to
DaimlerChrysler would increase state funds and, thus, benefit
taxpayers by decreasing the amount of taxes that they are required to
pay. 23  Based on this argument, he concluded that the type of
hypothetical claim of injury by the plaintiffs is inadequate to
proclaim that the plaintiffs have standing under Article III of the
United States Constitution.' 24  Chief Justice Roberts' line of
reasoning on this point is supported by a similar argument made by
Justice Kennedy in Kadish and the arguments by the majority opinion
in Warth. 125
Chief Justice Roberts advanced the idea that allowing taxpayers
to claim that an increase in state revenue should automatically result
in a decrease in tax burden for them is in violation of the powers
given to state governments. 26 He supported this argument by stating
that the federal govermment is not given the power of deciding how
state funds should be allocated.127 "To the contrary, the decision of
how to allocate any such savings is the very epitome of a policy
judgment committed to the 'broad and legitimate discretion' of
lawmakers which 'the courts cannot presume either to control or to
121. Id. at 1862-63.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1863.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Kadish, 490 U.S. at 614). In Kadish, Justice Kennedy stated,
"'[I]t is pure speculation where the lawsuit would result in any actual tax relief for
respondents."' Id. (quoting Kadish, 490 U.S. at 614). In Warth, the Court found a
lack of standing for a plaintiff taxpayer who claimed injury because of "'the
conjectural nature of the asserted injury."' Id. (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 509).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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predict.""128 While the Court's previous decisions regarding taxpayer
standing applied to federal taxpayers, Chief Justice Roberts drew a
parallel to state taxpayers.' 29  His conclusion is supported by the
Court's decision in Doremus v. Board of Education of Hawthorne, in
which the Court stated "'the interests of a taxpayer in the moneys of
the federal treasury are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain, and
indirect' to support standing to challenge 'their manner of
expenditure."" 30  In the majority opinion in Doremus, the Court
explicitly stated, "in rejecting a federal taxpayer challenge to a
federal statute 'as equally true when a state Act is assailed: the
[taxpayer] must be able to show.. .that he has sustained...some direct
injury... and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in
common with people generally."' 1 31
Chief Justice Roberts continued his reasoning by opining that the
taxpayers in this situation have not sufficiently fulfilled the
requirements needed for standing and the basis of their claim is not
unique from the claims made by previous taxpayers who have been
denied standing. 132  In fact, he compared the claims made by the
taxpayers in this situation to the claim made by the taxpayer in
Frothingham, in which a taxpayer claimed that the Maternity Act
was likely to result in an injury to the taxpayer in the form of a taking
of property absent "'due process of law."",13 3 Chief Justice Roberts
reiterated that the power of deciding how to spend state funds is
given solely to the states and the taxpayer has no power to dictate
how the money should be spent. 134 Furthermore, he stated that the
federal government does not have the power to dictate how the states
shall allocate their funds.' 35 Chief Justice Roberts also cited policy
128. Id. (quoting Kadish, 490 U.S. at 615).
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting Doremus v. Bd. of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433
(1952)).
131. Id. (quoting Doremus, 342 U.S. at 433-34 (quoting Frothingham, 262
U.S.. at 488)).
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486).
134. Id. (citing Kadish at 490 U.S. at 6150.
135. Id. at 1864.
reasons for not concluding that taxpayers do not have standing to
bring a lawsuit unless their injuries are direct.13 6
Indeed, because state budgets frequently contain an
array of tax and spending provisions, any number of
which may be challenged on a variety of bases,
affording state taxpayers standing to press such
challenges simply because their tax burden gives them
an interest in the state treasury would interpose the
federal courts as 'virtually continuing monitors of the
wisdom and soundness' of state fiscal administration,
contrary to the more modest role Article III envisions
for federal courts. 13 7
Chief Justice Roberts then addressed the claim made by the
plaintiffs that an exception to the Court's decision should exist for
those taxpayers whose claims involve a violation of the Commerce
Clause.' 38  The plaintiffs attempted to further their claim by
comparing their situation to that of the plaintiffs in Flast, in which
the plaintiffs claim was based on a violation of the Establishment
Clause.1 39 Plaintiffs looked to the holding in Flast, "because 'the
Establishment Clause.. .specifically limit[s] the taxing and spending
power conferred by Art. I, §8, a taxpayer will have standing
consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial power when he
alleges that congressional action under the taxing and spending
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
138. Id. Plaintiffs specifically say that an exception should be made for those
who are addressing a supposed violation of the Commerce Clause in terms of "state
tax or spending." Id.
139. Id. (citing Flast, 393 U.S. at 88). In Flast, the plaintiffs are challenging
the constitutionality of Title I and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 because the taxes collected from taxpayers were being used to fund
religiously affiliated schools. Flast, 392 U.S. at 85-86. Plaintiffs argued the
spending of tax funds on religiously affiliated schools is a violation of the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Id. at 86. The test that the Court created requires a taxpayer to
"establish a logical link between the status and the type of legislative enactment
attacked." Id. at 103.
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clause is in derogation of the Establishment Clause."'4 °  In its
decision in Flast, the Court gave potential plaintiffs a guideline in
which the Court would be willing to establish standing.14 ' If the
plaintiffs can establish that there is "'[constitutional] limitation' on
Art. I, §8" the Court will decide in favor of standing. 142 However,
the plaintiffs in this case have admitted that the only constitutional
challenge that has been concluded as sufficient for standing is the
Establishment Clause. 143 Chief Justice Roberts' reasoning then led
him to the conclusion that the Establishment Clause is a "narrow
exception... to the general rule against taxpayer standing" and is the
only exception that the Court is willing to give for taxpayer
standing. 14
4
Chief Justice Roberts also attacked the plaintiffs' comparison of
the situation to that of the plaintiffs in Flast.145 "Whatever rights
plaintiff have under the Commerce Clause, they are fundamentally
unlike the right not to 'contribute three pence ... for the support of any
one [religious] establishment.""' 146 Chief Justice Roberts reasoned
that the plaintiffs in Cuno have made a broad generalization in their
comparison to the plaintiffs in Flast.147 He believed that plaintiffs'
comparison of the Commerce Clause to the Establishment Clause is
so broad that "almost any constitutional constraint on government
power would 'specifically limit' a State's taxing and spending power
for Flast purposes."' 148 He concluded that a finding that a situation
involving the Commerce Clause is similar to a situation involving the
Establishment Clause would create a loss of a guideline that allows
the Court to differentiate the types of "constitutional provisions that
we [the Court] have recognized constrain governments' taxing and
140. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1864 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 105-106).
141. Id.
142. Id. (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 105).
143. Id. (citing Resp't.'s Br. 12).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 103).
147. Id. at 1865.
148. Id. (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 105).
spending decisions."' 4 9  Chief Justice Roberts also believed that
allowing a broad generalization of this situation would be contrary to
the Court's decision in Flast, in which the Court expressed that it
does not wish to "transform federal courts into forums for taxpayers
'general grievances."" '5 He then proceeded to give a synopsis of the
Court's reasoning in Flast.'5 '
He begins his synopsis by stating, "Flast is consistent with the
principle, underlying the Article III prohibition on taxpayer suits, that
a litigant may not assume a particular disposition of government
funds in establishing standing."' 52 He then explained that the Court
in Flast cited that the history of the Establishment Clause leads one
to reasonably conclude that the drafters worried that government
spending would be used to support a specific faith over another or to
support any sort of faith at all. 153 Based on this reasoning in Flast,
Chief Justice Roberts inferred that "[t]he Court therefore understood
the 'injury' alleged in Establishment Clause challenges to federal
spending to be the very 'extract[ion] and spend[ing]' of 'tax money'
in aid of religion alleged by a plaintiff."' 5 4 He distinguished the
argument based on the Establishment Clause and the argument based
on the Commerce Clause by reasoning that an injury caused by the
Establishment Clause can be remedied by an injunction of the
government spending, but an injury caused by the Commerce Clause
can only be remedied if the legislatures used the funds to the gain of
the specific taxpayer. 55  In other words, Chief Justice Roberts
rationalized that a remedy for an Establishment Clause violation
regarding the spending of the legislature is a general injunction, even
if the taxpayer who brought the lawsuit does not receive any personal
gain, whereas a Commerce Clause violation regarding the spending
149. Id. (citing Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987))
Ragland was a case in which a state sales tax was nullified because the Court held
that it violated the Free Press Clause. Id.
150. Id. (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 106).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing Flast, 392 U.S. at 103).
154. Id. (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 106).
155. Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 514 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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of the legislature would only be remedied if the taxpayer were to
receive a gain.
156
In the last part of his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts addressed the
plaintiffs' argument regarding their position as "municipal taxpayers"
and their ability to contest the "state franchise tax credit," which is at
the center of the lawsuit. 157 The plaintiffs used this argument to draw
a comparison to the situation in Frothingham. In Frothingham, the
Court allowed standing for "municipal residents to enjoin the 'illegal
use of the moneys of a municipal corporation' relying on 'the
peculiar relation of the corporate taxpayer to the corporation' to
distinguish such a case from the general bar on taxpayer suits."'158
Chief Justice Roberts noted that this argument did not persuade the
Court of Appeals based on the "merits" of the argument. 159 He then
identified a weakness in the plaintiffs' argument in that they have not
given the Court a causal link between their claimed injury and the
decisions of the government at the local level.' 6 ° Chief Justice
Roberts viewed the plaintiffs' argument as an attempt to "leverage
the notion of municipal taxpayer standing beyond challenges to
municipal action. '"161 He then identified the two ways he believed
that the plaintiffs attempted to use their status to challenge state
spending decisions. 162
The taxpayers' first attempt to "leverage" their position as
municipal taxpayers to actions at the state level as the plaintiffs'
argument that Ohio's laws oblige that the earnings from the franchise
tax be dispersed at the municipal level and that the tax benefit given
to the DaimlerChrysler Corporation has caused a deduction in the
amount of finances available for disbursement and the taxpayers will
be responsible to make up for the deficit. 163 Chief Justice Roberts
disregarded this argument because it is a contention against state
156. Id. (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 514 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting, Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486-487).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1866-68.
163. Id. at 1865 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.12 (Lexis 2005)).
spending rather than spending at the municipal level. 164 Based on
this reasoning, Chief Justice Roberts dismissed this argument for the
same reasons that were cited earlier, when he rejected taxpayer
standing for the plaintiffs when they challenged spending at the state
level. 165  He contended that this argument by the plaintiffs is an
attempt to bring one issue before the Court under the guise that it is
an entirely different issue.' 66
Chief Justice Roberts then explained the dangers of "assuming
that any revenue increase resulting from a taxpayer suit will be put to
a particular use."' 67 He cited the fact that Ohio's General Assembly
"suspended" the method of delivering funds generated from the
franchise tax to the municipal level in 2001 and has done so after that
year also.'68 He concluded from this example that the result of a tax
benefit to the DaimlerChrysler Corporation does not equal a burden
to the local level of government. 169  Instead, the burden is
theoretically based on the actions of the state government and
whether or not the state government will suspend the distribution of
funds to the local level.' 70 A theoretical injury is not sufficient for
plaintiff standing under Article III of the United States Constitution
and has been consistently rejected by the Court.' 7
The second method to "leverage" their status as a municipal
taxpayer and their standing to contest "municipal property tax
exemption into a challenge to the franchise tax credit by relying on
Mine Workers v. Gibbs."'172 Plaintiffs argued that the supplemental
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1866.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing Amended Substitute H. B. 94, 124th General Assembly § 140
(2001)).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Kadish, 490 U.S. at 614).
172. Id. (citing Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)). In Gibbs,
respondent was given damages by the United Mine Workers of America because a
lower court found that the United Mine Workers of America breached the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947. Id. at 718. Members of a mining group were
physically stopped from working on a mine. Id. The respondent also claimed that
the actions of the petitioner caused him to be fired and lose contracts he had made
during the course of his employment. Id. at 720. The Court held that the
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jurisdiction in Gibbs would apply to their case so long as the District
Court held that they have met the requirements needed for
standing. 7 3 The decision in Gibbs determined that federal-question
jurisdiction over a claim may authorize a federal court to exercise
jurisdiction over state-law claims that may be viewed as part of the
same case because they "derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact" as the federal claim. 174 Chief Justice Roberts began his analysis
of this argument by stating an assumption made by the plaintiffs in
that they believe that the Gibbs decision "stands for the proposition
that federal jurisdiction extends to all claims sufficiently related to a
claim within Article III to be part of the same case, regardless of the
nature of the deficiency that would keep the former claims out of
federal court if presented on their own."'175 Chief Justice Roberts
noted that the Court has been more careful in applying the Gibbs
decision.' 76 He cited an illustration of the Court's reluctance to
broadly apply the principle in Gibbs.'77 His illustration was the
Court's rejection of applying Gibbs in lawsuits involving "non-
diverse parties when jurisdiction was based on diversity."' 17 8 Chief
Justice Roberts also stated that the Court will not grant supplemental
jurisdiction to suits that do not meet the condition of "amount-in-
controversy." 79 He further noted the Court has recently stated "'we
have not...applied Gibbs' expansive interpretive approach to other
aspects of the jurisdictional statutes."'1 80  Chief Justice Roberts
explained that the Court has not used the decision in Gibbs to allow a
federal court to have supplemental jurisdiction over a suit when that
respondent did not establish that the union encouraged or was responsible for the
violent actions of some of its members. Id. at 742. Therefore, the Court reversed
the holding of the lower court. Id.
173. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1866 (citing Resp't.'s Br. 17-18).
174. Id. (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725).
175. Id.
176 Id.
177. Id. at 1866-67.
178. Id. at 1867 (citing Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365
(1978)).
179. Id. (citing Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989)).
180. Id. (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546
(2005)). In Allapattah, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 was used to permit a "federal court in a
diversity action to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional diverse
plaintiffs whose claims failed to meet the amount-in-controversy" requirement. Id.
suit does not meet the requirements of Article III, including that of
standing."'8 He disagreed with an expansion of the ruling in Gibbs in
light of the fact the Court has repeatedly held that a plaintiff must
meet the requirement of standing for each individual issue he
presents to the Court.' 82  Chief Justice Roberts then stated that the
Court has always required the plaintiffs to show standing for each
issue in their suit despite the fact that the issues and the relief
requested resulted from a "common nucleus of operative fact."' 83 He
further reiterated the fact that the Court required plaintiff to show
standing for each individual issue by arguing that the requirement
would be illogical if standing was easily transferable from one issue
to another issue in the same lawsuit, considering that all lawsuits
which request relief "derive from a 'common nucleus of operative
fact."1 84
Chief Justice Roberts proceeded to analyze the effect of the
plaintiffs' argument that standing would be considered sufficient for
all claims of relief if standing was found for one claim and all
subsequent claims arose from a "common nucleus of operative
fact."' 85 He began by stating, "the doctrines of mootness, ripeness,
and political question all originate in Article III's 'case' or
181. Id.
182. Id. (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 752). In Allen, the Court stated "'the
standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination of a complaint's allegations
to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the
particular claims asserted."' Id. (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (emphasis
added)). In Allen, parents of African American public school students brought a
lawsuit in which they claimed injury from an Internal Revenue Service tax
exemption for a private school that practiced racial discrimination in its admission
of students. Allen, 468 U.S. 737, 739 (1984). The plaintiffs further alleged that the
actions of the Internal Revenue Service causes them an actual injury because it
hinders their children from getting an education at the school by providing support
to the school despite its discriminatory practice. Id. at 739-40. The Court held that
the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the lawsuit because they did not
establish a direct injury caused by the actions of the Internal Revenue Service. Id.
at 740.
183. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1867.
184. Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc,, 528 U.S. 167, 175-79 (2000)).
185. Id. (quoting Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 175).
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'controversy' language, no less than standing does."' 8 6  If the
plaintiffs' argument was implemented by the Court, then the cases
that involve mootness, ripeness, and political questions would be
deemed appropriate for the Court to hear under the "case" or
"controversy" requirement of Article III because they would be from
the same "operative facts" as a claim that did not have a problem
with mootness, ripeness, or political question. 18 7  Chief Justice
Roberts then reasoned that allowing the plaintiffs' argument to
succeed would cause a substantial change in how the Court deals
with these types of issues because the Court could not rely on its
previous rulings, which have held that the Court can not hear cases
that involve mootness, or ripeness, or political question issues. 188 He
concluded that the plaintiffs' interpretation of Gibbs would lead to a
complete modification of what types of cases the Courts are
authorized to hear and this modification is inconsistent with Article
111.189 Plaintiffs interpretation of Gibbs would corrode the purpose
of Article III.' 90 The Article III standing requirement would become
void for all practical purposes because the plaintiffs' interpretation of
Gibbs would not require the "actual injury requirement" that the
Court has required in the past.' 9' "The actual-injury requirement
would hardly serve the purpose to the political branches[s] if once a
plaintiff demonstrated harm from one particular inadequacy in
government administration, the court were authorized to remedy all
inadequacies in that administration."' 92  Chief Justice Roberts
186. Id. (citing Nat'l Park Hospitality Assn. v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803,
808; Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. 43, 67; Reservists Comm. To Stop
the War, 418 U.S. at 215).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. Chief Justice Roberts explained, "determining that a matter before
the federal courts is a proper case or controversy under Article III therefore
assumes particular importance in ensuring that the Federal Judiciary respects 'the
proper and properly limited role of the courts in a democratic society."' Cuno, 126
S. Ct. at 1860 (quoting Wright, 468 U.S. at 737).
191. Id. at 1867-68.
192. Id. at 1867-68 (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996)). In
Lewis, the Court stressed that "'the remedy must of course be limited to the
inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established."' Id. at
1868 (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358). In Lewis, the plaintiffs were prisoners in
restated his conclusion that the plaintiffs' have not established the
requirement of injury needed for standing under Article III for their
claim against the Ohio state levy.' 93 Chief Justice Roberts also stated
that if the plaintiffs were able to establish standing for their claim
regarding municipal taxes, that would not allow the plaintiffs to
transfer standing from that issue to the issue of "state taxes."1 94
Chief Justice Roberts then addressed the cases that the plaintiffs use
to support their contention that a broad reading of Gibbs should apply
to their situation.195 The plaintiffs supported their argument using
cases from the Court of Appeals. 96  Chief Justice Roberts
highlighted the fact that a couple of the cases used by the plaintiffs
"hold only that, once a litigant has standing to request invalidation of
a particular agency action, it may do so by identifying all grounds on
which the agency may have 'failed to comply with its statutory
mandate."",197  He explained that the cases do not stand for the
contention that having standing to dispute one government action
gives a plaintiff standing to dispute another government action that
has not caused the plaintiff any direct harm.' 98 Chief Justice Roberts
dismissed the plaintiffs' argument that a third case is analogous to
various correctional facilities in the state of Arizona. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 346. The
class action lawsuit was brought by the prisoners because they allege that they were
being denied a right to use the legal facilities and resources in the prisons. Id. In
addition to a general lawsuit on behalf of all of the prisoners, the suit also included
specific claims on behalf of two groups of prisoners, those who were separated
from the general prison population and those who lacked the ability to read and
write in English or at all. Id. at 346-47. The plaintiffs claim that these two groups
were not given sufficient legal aid for their cases. Id. In its reasoning, the Court
stated that the prisoners who are not a part of the two specific groups must show
that the lack of access to the legal resources in the prison caused them a direct
injury. Id. at 348. The Court was not persuaded by the plaintiffs' argument that
they were directly injured. Id. at 356. The Court did not feel that the plaintiffs had
did not have a direct injury for the purpose of establishing standing. Id. The Court
did hold that the two groups of prisoners was able to establish a direct injury. Id.
The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court, which gave the prisoners the
remedy of an injunction against the prisons. Id. at 348, 364.
193. Cuno, 126 S. Ct at 1867-68.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1868, n.5
197. Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Adams, 405 U.S. 727, 737 (1972)).
198. Id.
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their situation. 199 He alluded to the fact that the Court in the third
case used by the plaintiffs was deciding an issue that involved the
"unprofessional conduct by those attorneys who are practicing before
them" and this issue is too different from the plaintiffs' situation to
be deemed analogous. 2
00
Chief Justice Roberts began the conclusion of his opinion by
stating that the plaintiffs have not established the requirements
needed for standing under Article III of the United States
Constitution for the issue of the state franchise tax.201 As a result of
the plaintiffs lacking standing to bring this lawsuit before the Court,
the District Court and the Court of Appeals who decided this case on
the merits did so without having the authority to hear the case.2 °2
Chief Justice Roberts directed the "judgment of the Sixth Circuit is
therefore, vacated in part, and the cases are remanded for dismissal of
plaintiffs' challenge to the [state] franchise tax credit. 20 3
B. Justice Ginsburg's Concurring Opinion
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion began with an affirmation
of the majority opinion's highlighting of the Court's previous
decision regarding the issue of standing under Article 111.204 Justice
Ginsburg reasoned that the Court's opinion in this case holds true
with respect to previous decisions such as Frothingham.20 5 She
stated her agreement with the majority opinion's analogy between
this case and Frothingham, in that the "taxpayer's interest" is
"minute and indeterminable."2 °6  She alluded to the decision of
Doremus, in which the Court applied its reasoning in
Frothingham.20 7  Justice Ginsburg then stated that the only
199. Id.
200. Id. (quoting Jackson v. United States, 881 F.2d 707, 710-711 (9th Cir.
1989)).
201. Id. at 1868.
202. Id. at 1868.
203. Id.
204. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
205. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
206. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Frothingham, 342 U.S. at 434).
207. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). One of the plaintiffs in Doremus was a
taxpayer who has a daughter that attends the school involved in the suit. Dorem us,
recognized exception to Frothingham is the Establishment Clause
claim brought before the Court in Flast.20 8 After stating that an
exception exists, Justice Ginsburg stated that the Court has thus far
been unwilling to expand this exception to other matters.2 °9
Justice Ginsburg supported her concurrence with the conclusion
reached in Frothingham: taxpayers do not have standing to bring a
lawsuit in reaction to the spending decisions of a government entity
unless they can prove a direct injury.210 However, she did not agree
with the restrictions the Court put on plaintiff standing in Simon v.
342 U.S. at 431. This lawsuit was brought by the plaintiffs because they believed
that a statute which required the school to recite from the Bible was
unconstitutional. Id. at 432. The plaintiffs argued that they had standing because
the reading from the Bible has caused them an injury. Id. However, the Court
disagreed with this argument because of a stipulation made by the parties to the
lawsuit in which they agreed that any student was free to leave during the recitation
from the Bible. Id. The plaintiffs in this case did not take advantage of the ability
to leave during the recitations. Id. Furthermore, the daughter of one of the
plaintiffs had already graduated from the school by the time the lawsuit reached the
Court. Id. The Court reasoned, "[it] does not sit to decide arguments after events
have put them to rest." Id. at 433 (citing United States v. Alaska Steamship Co.,
253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920)). The Court also reasoned that the taxpayers in this
lawsuit need to show that their financial interest have been injured in a way that is
not commonly shared with every taxpayer as a result of the government action. Id.
at 435. The Court held that the plaintiffs were not able to show that their interest
has been injured in a way that is unique to them and not shared by every taxpayer;
therefore the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this lawsuit. Id. The dissent by
Justice Douglass disagreed with the reasoning of the majority. Id. (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas argued that the case should be heard and decided on
the merits because "there is no group more interested in the operation and
management of the public schools than the taxpayers who support them and the
parents whose children attend them." Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas
proceeded to argue that the plaintiffs would have a valid argument when claiming
that the recitation of the Bible takes away from another program that the school
could be running and the program that was sacrificed as a result of the Bible
program was the program that the taxes were meant to support. Id. (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas concluded his opinion by stating that New Jersey,
without any worry of constitutionality, would be able to allow the taxpayers to
bring this lawsuit before its courts by giving taxpayers the authority to bring this
suit. Id. at 435-36 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
208. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1868.
209. Id. (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988)).
210. Id.
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Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.2 11 She concluded her concurring
opinion by reiterating that she agrees with the decision reached by
the Court, but does not agree with the reasoning in Simon, which the
majority opinion used to support its conclusion. 212
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Legal Impact
This decision has solidified the Court's unwillingness to allow
taxpayers to bring a lawsuit unless they can prove they have been
directly harmed.213 Furthermore, the holding has also confirmed the
fact that the Establishment Clause is the only exception the Court has
211. Id. (citing Simon, 426 U.S. 26 (1976)). In Simon, plaintiffs brought an
action against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. Simon, 426 U.S. at 28. The plaintiffs argued that the Internal Revenue
Service was in violation of its own code and of the Administrative Procedure Act
when it allowed a tax break to a nonprofit hospital. Id. The hospital only provided
emergency services to the plaintiffs who have brought the lawsuit. Id. Plaintiffs
attempted to establish a direct injury for the purposes of standing by arguing that
they were injured because they did not have access to services other than
emergency services at the hospital. Id. at 40-41. The Court reasoned,
Although the law of standing has been greatly changed in
[recent] years, we have steadfastly adhered to the requirement
that, at least in the absence of a statute expressly conferring
standing, federal plaintiffs must allege some threatened or actual
injury resulting from the putatively illegal action before a federal
court may assume jurisdiction.
Id. at 41 (quoting Linda v. Richard, 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973)).
In other words, the "case or controversy" limitation of Art. III still requires that
a federal court act only to redress injury which fairly can be traced to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the independent
action of some third party not before the court.
The plaintiffs in this case did not make the hospitals parties to the lawsuit and
brought this action against the Internal Revenue Service under the premise that
their actions have caused an injury to them via the lack of service by the hospital.
Id. at 40-42. The Court did not find a causal link between the Internal Revenue
Service's actions and the injury of the plaintiffs. Id. at 42. The Court held that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to bring this lawsuit. Id. at 28.
212. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1869.
213. Id. at 1854.
been willing to deem sufficient for standing requirements under
Article J11.214The holding in this case impacts other programs which a state can
offer to corporations. For example, a state that chooses to give a
corporation a cash-back incentive for operating in the state instead of
a tax break is likely protected against a taxpayer lawsuit. 21 5 The
holding in this case may protect states in the situation because the
economic result of the two types of programs are the same and
therefore, one can apply the reasoning used in this decision to the
situation where a taxpayer brings a lawsuit against a state program
that gives a cash back incentive to corporations operating in the
state.216
The Supreme Court has stated that the fundamental inquiry under
the dormant Commerce Clause is the 'actual effect' of a state's tax
policies upon interstate commerce. From this premise, if the property
tax exemption is constitutionally infirm because of its economic
ramifications, the comparable cash grant must similarly violate the
dormant Commerce Clause because of its equivalent economic
effects on interstate commerce.21 7
While the Court did not go to the merits of the taxpayer's claim
as to the constitutionality of the property tax exemption, the Court
did hold that the taxpayer's did not have standing to bring such a suit
against the state in the first place.21 8 Therefore, if one were to follow
the reasoning of the above argument regarding the "equivalent
economic effects on interstate commerce," one could reasonably
conclude that the cash-back incentive would also be shielded from
taxpayer lawsuits because a taxpayer who has not been directly
injured would not have standing to bring such a lawsuit before the
Court.
2 19
Another situation in which this logic would apply is if the local
government "granted to [a corporation] a no-interest loan equivalent
214. Id. at 1864-65.
215. Edward A. Zelinsky, DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno and the Constitutionality
of State Tax Incentives for Economic Development: Cuno: the Property Tax Issue,
4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 123 (2006).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1859.
219. Zelinsky, supra note 215 at 123.
Fall 2007 The Supreme Court Once Again
634 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 27-2
economic effect to the property tax exemption."22  If the local
government provided this type of incentive to a corporation such as
DaimlerChrysler, it could be protected from a taxpayer lawsuit
because this holding would not allow the lawsuit due to lack of
standing.2 2 '
A third situation that would likely grant states protection against
taxpayer lawsuits is if the local government actually charged a
corporation the property tax that it owes under state law, but in
exchange for the property tax, the local government would "in kind
services (e.g., worker raining, roads, sewers) of equal value...-222
Again, using the logic from this case and the situations discussed
above,223 the taxpayer would not have standing to bring a lawsuit for
this type of contractual agreement between the government and the
corporation unless that taxpayer was able to prove that he or she was
directly injured by the agreement.224
While one can conjure a number of situations in which the state
can give a monetary incentive to corporations in exchange for the
corporation's promise to operate in the state, most of these situations
will be protected against an attack by a taxpayer plaintiff because this
holding will not allow the taxpayer to bring the lawsuit unless he or
she can prove that it has caused him an injury that is not shared by
taxpayers as a whole.22' This decision, however, has not clarified
situations where a state's interference with commerce among the
states is within Constitutional limitations.
In the past, the Court has grappled with whether a state tax
"discriminates against interstate commerce." 226  One such case is
Boston Stock Exchange v. Miss. State Tax Commission.227 In that
1968 case, the Court was presented with the issue of whether a
220. Id.
221. See Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006).
222. Zelinsky, supra note 215 at 123.
223. See infra notes 216-222 and accompanying text.
224. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1862-63.
225. Id.
226. S. Mohsin Reza, Comment, DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno: an Escape from
the Dormant Commerce Clause Quagmire? 40 U. RICH. L. REv. 1229, 1239-40
(2006).
227. Id. (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady Chairman, Miss. Tax
Comm'n., 430 U.S. 274 (1977)).
change to New York's tax law regarding the exchange of "securities"
violated the Constitution.22 8 This change to the tax law was New
York's reaction to the growth of stock exchanges in other United
States cities.229 The change in the law resulted in a smaller tax rate
for exchanges that happened in the state of New York, as opposed to
those that happened in another state. 230  This decreased tax rate
would also extend to those who were not residents of New York but
chose to do an exchange in New York.23 ' The change in the law also
resulted in a higher tax rate for out of state residents who transfer
stocks from other states.232 The Supreme Court decided that the
change in the law did "discriminate against interest commerce
because the 'obvious effect of the tax is to extend a financial
advantage to sales on the New York [stock] exchanges at the expense
of regional exchanges.' 233 The Court did express that its holding
was not meant to stifle the growth of trade among the states.234 This
case served as a reference for a type of interference with commerce
among the states that is not permissible. 235 However, the Court did
not give direction as to how to create such an incentive without
interfering with commerce among the states.236
Another case presented before the Supreme Court regarding a tax
break given by a state was Westinghouse Electric. Corp. v. Tully.237
In Tully, the state of New York began offering a tax break after
learning that the Internal Revenue Code was revised by Congress.238
The legislation allowed for the formation of a type of business known
228. Id. (citing Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 319
(1977).
229. Id. (citing Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 323).
230. Id. (citing Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 324).
231. Id. (citing Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 324-25).
232. Id. (citing Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 324-25).
233. Id. (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 331).
234. Id. (citing Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 336).
235. Id.
236. Id. (citing Walter Hellerstien & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause
Restrains on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789,
795-96 (1996)).
237. Id. (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 389 (1984)).
238. Id. at 1241-42 (citing Tully, 466 U.S. at 390).
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as "Domestic International Sales Corporation. 23 9 The purpose of
this legislation was to help domestic businesses in sending more
products abroad. 240 The aid that Congress sought to provide to the
domestic business came in the form of tax breaks.24' The tax break
exempted a Domestic International Sales Corporation from having to
pay tax on revenue.242 New York was apprehensive about adopting
this legislation because it would have created a $20-$30 million
deficit in the state's tax income per year.243 However, the state of
New York feared lack of adoption might cause corporations to do
their business in other states that have adopted the legislation.244 In
response to the federal legislation, New York created its own
legislation, which was intended to fulfill the following purposes: "(1)
consolidate the income of the [Domestic International Sales
Corporation] with the income of its parent for state tax purposes and;
(2) provide a partial franchise tax credit to the parent company by
lowering the tax rate to thirty percent on [Domestic International
Sales Corporation] income as reflected in consolidated return. 245
Westinghouse Electric Export, a subsidiary of one of the parties to
this case, was primarily in the business of exportation.246  The
company failed to report all of its Domestic International Sales
Corporation revenue on its tax forms.247  The New York Tax
Commission subsequently challenged the corporation as to the proper
amount of Domestic International Sales Corporation revenue. 248 The
corporations responded by filing a claim that alleged "'the tax benefit
of the [Domestic International Sales Corporation] export credit to
gross receipts from shipments attributable to a New York place of
business violated the Commerce, Due Process, and Equal Protection
239. Id. (citing Tully, 466 U.S. at 390).
240. Id. at 1242 (citing Tully, 466 U.S. at 390).
241. Id. (citing Tully, 466 U.S. at 390).
242. Id. (citing Tully, 466 U.S. at 392.
243. Id. (citing Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 392-93).
244. Id. (citing Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 393).
245. Id. (citing Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 394).
246. Id. (citing Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 394).
247. Id. (citing Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 395).
248. Id. (citing Boston Stock Exch. ,429 U.S. at 395-96).
Clauses."' 2 4 9 The Supreme Court held that New York's legislation
was in violation of the Commerce Clause.25 0 The reason cited by the
Court was that while the legislation encouraged business growth in
New York, it did so at the detriment of growth in other States. 25' The
decision reiterated the Court's reasoning in Boston Exchange in that a
tax is a constitutional violation if used to create growth in one state at
the detriment of the growth in another state.252 The Court remained
consistent in noting that this decision would not render states helpless
in attempts to create economic growth within their own boundaries so
long as other states do not suffer the consequences of the incentives
used to create the growth.253
Had the Court not addressed the issue of standing prior to the
issue of whether the tax credits were constitutional, the Cuno case
would have become authority on the constitutionality of tax credits
given by states to corporations as incentive to jump-start the
economy of the state. Prior to Cuno, the most current case that the
Court decided regarding the issue of tax credits was New Energy
Company of Indiana v. Limbach.254 In Limbach, the Court made a
decision regarding an Ohio law which allowed the state to give "fuel
dealers a tax credit for each gallon of ethanol sold against the state's
motor fuel sales tax if that ethanol was produced in Ohio or in
another state that gave an incentive to Ohio-produced ethanol. 255 A
company in Indiana brought an action against the state due to the fact
it was could not receive such a benefit because Indiana did not
provide a tax break and only provided a subsidy.256 Ohio contended
that its tax incentive program served as an example for other states to
follow in the way of tax incentives as a means of encouragement for
economic growth.257 The Court was not persuaded by this argument
249. Id. (at 1242-43 (quoting Boston Stock Exch.,429 U.S. at 400-01).
250. Id. (at 1243 citing Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 400-0 1).
251. Id. (citing Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 406).
252. Id. See Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 336.
253. Id. (citing Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 406 n.12 (citing Bacchus
Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 273 (1984))).
254 Id. at 1244 (citing New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, Tax Comm'n of
Ohio, 486 U.S. 269 (1988)).
255. Id. (citing Limbach, 486 U.S. at 271).
256. Id. (citing Limbach, 486 U.S. at 272-73).
257. Id. (citing Limbach, 486 U.S. at 274).
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and held that the tax incentive was not valid.2 8  The Court also
addressed the argument made by Ohio that a state can use a
legislative act that promotes state and municipal purpose despite the
fact that it may interfere with interstate commerce if the state can
establish that the same results would not be achieved in a manner that
did not interfere with interstate commerce.259 While the Court agreed
that there are instances in which a state can interfere with interstate
commerce for a local purpose, it also expressed that the state must
meet a high standard to prove that the means of interfering with
interstate commerce was necessary to meet the end result.260 Ohio
attempted to argue that two "local purposes" were served by its
program: "(1) promoting ethanol, a component of gasohol, would
reduce harmful exhaust emissions and; (2) providing a reciprocity
condition would help persuade other states to provide incentives for
ethanol production as well.",261 The Court held that the reasons cited
by Ohio for its actions did not meet the high standard that the Court
requires to uphold such action as constitutional.262 This decision
demonstrates that the Court is unlikely to declare State programs
which "discriminate" against other state policies constitutional,
especially if the effects of the "discrimination" can be achieved
through "nondiscriminatory alternatives."2 63
This decision could have served to create a guideline for
determining which specific actions a State can take without
interfering with the Commerce Clause. However, because the
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the case, no such clarification
occurred.
B. Social Impact
This decision will heavily impact the means in which disgruntled
taxpayers get relief for government spending they feel has caused a
negative impact on them. Taxpayers who cannot prove that they
258. Id. (citing Limbach, 486 U.S. at 276 (citing Kane v. New Jersey, 242
U.S. 160 (1916))).
259. Id. (citing Limbach, 486 U.S. at 278).
260. Id. at 1244-45 (citing Limbach, 486 U.S. at 278).
261. Id. at 1245 (citing Limbach, 486 U.S. at 279-80).
262. Id. (citing Limbach, 486 U.S. at 280).
263. Id. at 1245.
have suffered a direct injury from a decision that the legislature made
regarding the allocation of state funds will not meet the standing
requirement to bring their lawsuit before the Court.2 6 4 Therefore,
taxpayers will have to resort to actions other than lawsuits to remedy
their contention to the way that the legislature is spending taxpayer
funds. If taxpayers are unhappy about the actions of the legislature,
their only course of action might be to use their voting power to elect
new officials. In other words, the taxpayers will have to deal with
the legislatures on a direct basis and cannot use the judicial system to
change the course of legislative action which does not directly harm
the taxpayers.
The decision will also have a heavy impact on the states. Based
on this decision, states who wish to give incentives to companies in
an attempt to revive the state's economy can do so without having to
fear legal action brought by a taxpayer. One of the only times the
states might have to defend its actions in a courtroom will be if the
taxpayer who has brought a lawsuit against the state was directly
harmed in a way that is not shared amongst the common
population.2 65 Besides being directly affected, the taxpayer might
force a state to defend its actions if the taxpayer is bringing a lawsuit
that claims that the action of the state was in violation of the
Establishment Clause.266
The societal impact also reaches other corporations that have
considered making a contractual agreement with state
governments.267 For example, Philip Morris, a corporation involved
in the tobacco industry, made a decision to move its operations from
New York City to Richmond, Virginia. 268 Philip Morris planned to
spend $250 million on equipment and $50 million on its plant in
264. See Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1863-64.
265. See Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1863.
266. See id. at 1864.
267. S. Mohsin Reza, Comment, DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno: an Escape from
the Dormant Commerce Clause Quagmire? 40 U. RICH. L. REv. 1229 (2006).
268. Id. (citing John Reid Blackwell, Tobacco Town, USA; Philip Morris USA
Will Move its NYC Headquarters Here in June, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar.
5, 2003, at A1).
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Virginia.2 69 In exchange for this economic investment, Virginia was
to provide Philip Morris with a tax breaks worth approximately $30
million.270  Philip Morris is among the many companies that are
taking advantage of tax incentives given to the corporations by state
and local governments. 27 1 Part of the argument of those who do not
believe that credits should be given, is that these programs allow state
governments to unfairly decide which corporations will be extended
this offer.272 Another argument is that the tax revenue that the State
loses by giving corporations a tax break could have been used to
make "improvements" in State.273 However, some believe that the
tax incentives given by the States do not equalize the benefits
received by the States by having corporation expand operations in the
State.274 These critics question the motives of the corporations that
expand in states that offer tax breaks as incentives for the
expansion. 75 They do not believe that the real reason for the
relocation is the tax incentive. 2
76
In this age of outsourcing, politicians face immense pressure to
keep jobs at home, and when new jobs are created, they are quick to
associate themselves with job growth. Therefore, it can be expected
that politicians and the state tax analysts who work for them are
resistant to limiting incentives or any other tools that may help their
269. Id. (citing John Reid Blackwell, Tobacco Town, USA; Philip Morris USA
Will Move its NYC Headquarters Here in June, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar.
5, 2003, at Al).
270. Id. (citing John Reid Blackwell, Tobacco Town, USA; Philip Morris USA
Will Move its NYC Headquarters Here in June, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar.
5, 2003, at Al).
271. Id. at 1241 (citing Bush Bernard, Nissan Deal New Benchmark,
Economic Developers Say, THE TENNESSEAN, Dec. 4, 2005, at 3A).
272. Id. at 1232 (citing Scott Bass, Illegal Bait? The Latest in Business Lures:
Tax Incentives may be Unconstitutional, STYLE WKLY., Aug. 31, 2005, available at
http://www.styleweekly.com/article.asp?idarticle= 10880).
273. Id. at 1231 (citing Michael Mazerov, Center on Budget & Policy
Priorities, Should Congress Authorize States to Continue Giving Tax Breaks to
Businesses? (2005), available at http://www.cbpp.org/2-18-05sfp.pdf).
274. Id. (citing David Brunori, The Politics of State Taxation: Helping States
to Hurt Themselves, STATE TAx TODAY, June 6, 2005, available at 2005 STT 107-
5 (LEXIS)).
275. Id. at 1232-33.
276. Id.
state compete for jobs with other states. Unsurprisingly, opponents
of tax incentives have been unsuccessful, thus far, in convincing state
legislatures to forego these tax credits. 277
The Cuno decision did not resolve whether these critics were
correct, but it did resolve the fact that the Court will not likely find a
taxpayer established standing to bring a suit against a state for
offering tax incentives to corporations.278
II. CONCLUSION
The Cuno decision further reiterates the Court's unwillingness to
allow standing for taxpayer lawsuits against a government entity or a
corporation. 27 9 The Court held to its previous decisions in which
they have required the taxpayer to show that the injury that they
allege in the lawsuit be unique to them, and not something that is
shared by all taxpayers in general. 280 The only exception that the
Court has recognized for taxpayer standing is when the claim
involves an alleged violation of the Establishment Clause.281 This
decision has served to demonstrate the Court's consistency in not
allowing standing for taxpayer lawsuits. 282  Furthermore, this
decision sends the message to taxpayers that they must use another
means to remedy an injury that is shared with all taxpayers.283
277. Id. at 1232-33.
278. See Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854.
279. See id.
280. Id. at 1863-64.
281. Id. at 1865 (citing Flast, 392 U.S. at 88).
282. See id.
283. See id.
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